UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-29-2008

State v. Eldred Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34718

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Eldred Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34718" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1952.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1952

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

NO. 34718

)

v.

)
)

SHARON KAY ELDRED
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRr=::.:::IE:.;,,F=--

['l.·. F·. :.1}.~~~t;()f51,,;·-~ 0
t,,_.., ..,_ ,,:;;;

~t,,,~

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Supmme"'5owt _-=cOW/oit·':J)t:;,:c

,..~.~~"?::!2S by:."~--:,..,.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE GORDON W. PETRIE
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

HEATHER M. CARLSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
1.S.B. # 7148
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................4
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 5
The State Violated Ms. Eld red's Right To A Fair Trial,
Guaranteed By The Fifth And Fourteenth Amendments
To The United States Constitution And Article I,§ 13
Of The Idaho Constitution, By Committing Multiple Acts
Of Prosecutorial Misconduct During The Closing
Arguments ................................................................................................... 5
A. lntroduction ................................................................................................. 5
B. Standard Of Review ...................................................................................5
C. Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The
State Violated Ms. Edlred's Right To A Fair Trial By
Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
During The Closing Arguments .................................................................. 5
1. The Prosecutor Improperly Misstated The Presumption
Of Innocence, And Commented On The Ultimate Fact
For The Jury When She Referred To The Defendant's
Cloak Of Innocence And Her Burden Of Proof.. .................................... 7
2. The Prosecutor Improperly Misrepresented The Evidence
In Closing Arguments .......................................................................... 10
3. The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jury's
Emotions, Asking The Jury To Image Themselves In
The "Victim's" Shoes ........................................................................... 11
4. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless And
Deprived Ms. Eldred Of Her Right To A Fair Trial ............................... 13

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498 (Ok. Crim. App. 1999) ........................................ 8
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ............................................................... 13
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ........................................................ 14
Hamilton v. State, 937 P.2d 1001 (Ok. Crim. App. 1997) ...................................... 8
Millerv. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) ........................................................................ 10
Mi/lerv. State, 843 P.2d 389 (Ok. Crim. App. 1992) .............................................9
Pagano v. Allard, 218 F.Supp.2d 26 (D. Mass. 2002) ........................................... 8
People v. Brooks, 345 ll1.App.3d 945, 803 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. 2004) .. ,............. 8
People v. Toney, 337 lll.App.3d 122, 785 N.S.2d 138 (Ill. App. 2003) .................. 8
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.2d 1175 (2007) ............................ 5, 6
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) .......................................... 5, 6
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 189 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2008) .............................. 13
State v. Hamson, No. 26654, (Ct. App. June 19, 2001) ...................................... 13
State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 85 P.3d 1109 (Ct. App. 2003) ...............................6
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ...........................................6
State v. Miles, 139 Wash.App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169 (Wash.App.Div.2. 2007) ....... 7
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007) ..............................6
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) .................................7
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498,616 P.2d 1034 (1980) ........................................ 14
State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346,509 P.2d 331 (1973) ....................................... 13
United States v. Feams, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974) ........................................ 10

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Sharon Kay Eldred appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment
Order sentencing her to ten years, with three years fixed. Ms. Eldred asserts that her
right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, was
violated because of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case. Specifically, Ms. Eldred
asserts the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" culminating in the prosecutor
misrepresenting the presumption of innocence, expressing her own belief in
Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresenting the evidence, and appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
David Jones was driving onto the interstate when he noticed the white Ford
Tempo in front of him driving erratically. (Trial Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.47, L.12.) He began to
follow the car westbound toward Nampa, Idaho and eventually called dispatch when he
became concerned about the car's erratic driving. (Trial Tr., p.47, L.12 - p.48, L.10.)
He followed the white Tempo for two hours, including several stops. (Trial Tr., p.48,
L.11 - p.68, L.14.) At one point, the white Tempo stopped at WALMART, Mr. Jones
approached the car, and attempted to speak with the driver, whom he identified as
Ms. Eldred, before she drove off again. (Trial Tr., p.54, L.3 - p.61, L.16.) Eventually
the car stopped at a residence in Middleton, Idaho, Ms. Eldred got out of the car, and
she went into the home. (Trial Tr., p.66, L.2 - p.68, L.10.) As Ms. Eldred was entering
the home, Officer Chamberlain finally arrived and Mr. Jones directed him to Ms. Eldred,
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explaining she was the driver of the white Tempo Mr. Jones had reported.

(Trial

Tr., p.66, l.2 - p.68, l.10, p.86, L.15, p.92, L.5 - p.96, L.23.)
Officer Chamberlain parked his patrol vehicle and followed Ms. Eldred into the
home. (Trial Tr., p.97, L 18 - p.102, L.9.) After attempting to conduct field sobriety
tests, Officer Chamberlain arrested Ms. Eldred and took her to the Canyon County Jail.
(Trial Tr., p.109, L.6 - p.111, L 10.) Ms. Eldred agreed to submit to an lntoxilyzer 5000
breath test. (Trial Tr., p.114, Ls.15-17, p.119, Ls.2-6.} Her breath tests results were
both .264; however, the test indicated the samples were deficient. (Trial Tr., p.119, L.13
- p.120, L.8.}
Ms. Eldred was subsequently charged by Information with felony operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp.25-28.) Ms. Eldred filed a
motion to suppress arguing that the officer's entry into the home to seize Ms. Eldred
was unconstitutional and the evidence obtained should be suppressed as a fruit of this
illegal search and seizure. (R., pp.36-38.) The motion was ultimately denied by the
district court, in part because she never established she had standing in the residence
Officer Chamberlain entered without consent. (R., pp.54, 110-22.)
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The case proceeded to trial and the jury ultimately found Ms. Eldred guilty of
driving under the influence of alcohol and Ms. Eldred pied guilty to the felony
enhancement.

(R., p.108; Trial Tr., p.250, Ls.2-20.)

The district court sentenced

Ms. Eldred to ten years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.130-31.) Ms. Eldred filed a

1

Because Ms. Eldred's standing to challenge the illegal entry into the residence was
never established below, the denial of her motion to suppress is not being pursued on
appeal.
2

timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's Judgment and Commitment.
(R., pp.132-35.)
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ISSUE
Did the State violate Ms. Eldred's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during the
closing arguments?
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ARGUMENT
The State Violated Ms. Eldred's Right To A Fair Trial. Guaranteed By The Fifth And
Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution And Article I.§ 13 Of The
Idaho Constitution, By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct During
The Closing Arguments
A.

Introduction
Ms. Eldred asserts that the prosecutor violated her right to a fair trial, guaranteed

by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution, when she misrepresented the presumption of
innocence, expressed her own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresented the evidence,
and appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury.

These prosecutorial "foul

blows" committed during trial and closing arguments amounted to fundamental error
and this Court should vacate Ms. Eld red's conviction in light of this misconduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
Prosecutorial misconduct will only be reviewed for fundamental error absent an

objection below. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 185 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). The
Idaho Courts have noted that when reviewing fundamental error each case will "stand
on its own merits" and "[o]ut of the facts in each case will arise the law." State v.
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v.
Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 778 P.2d 424 432 (1989)).
C.

Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Violated Ms. Edlred's
Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
During The Closing Arguments
Although there was no objection to the prosecutor's comments at trial and during

closing arguments in this case, prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for
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fundamental error when there has not been an objection made below. See State v.
Field. 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,

715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003).

A fundamental error is one that "'so

profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused
of his constitutional right to due process."' State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470,
163 P.2d 1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d
956,970 (2003); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,180,824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has
been defined as an error which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights
or... to the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was
essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id.
(quoting State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989)).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "[p]rosecutorial misconduct rises to the
level of fundamental error when it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and
arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors
may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Kuhn, 139 Idaho
at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. The prosecutor's actions or comments must be so egregious
or inflammatory that a curative jury instruction could not have remedied the misconduct.
Id. This reflects the rationale behind the rule, that even if the defendant had made a

timely objection to the inflammatory statements, the objection would not have cured the
inherent prejudice. Id. This also reflects the fact that the trial court itself possesses the
power to sua sponte intervene when prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious
and prejudicial. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88 n.2, 156 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (Ct. App.
2007) (noting that "[t]he trial courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged
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to monitor the course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and
to impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right to a fair
trial"). Therefore, when reviewing a question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate
Court must first determine whether the complained about conduct was improper, then, if
so, whether the misconduct impinged on the defendant's right to a fair trial, or whether
the misconduct was harmless. Kuhn, 139 Idaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114.
In this case, the prosecutor struck multiple "foul blows" during the closing
arguments, including misrepresenting the presumption of innocence, expressing her
own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt, misrepresenting the evidence, and appealing to the
passions and prejudices of the jury.

1.

The Prosecutor Improperly Misstated The Presumption Of Innocence. And
Commented On The Ultimate Fact For The Jury When She Referred To
The Defendant's Cloak Of Innocence And Her Burden Of Proof

It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law or the
reasonable doubt standard in closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at
587); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 {1993). See also
State v. Miles, 139 Wash.App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169 (Wash.App.Div.2. 2007) ("Although
prosecutors have "wide latitude" to make inferences about witness credibility, it is
flagrant misconduct to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.")

It is the State's

burden to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant
has no duty to present any evidence.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

Likewise it is misconduct for the prosecutor to include her personal opinions and beliefs
about the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.
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Although the Idaho Appellate Courts have never specifically addressed this
specific misconduct, several jurisdictions have found it to be misconduct when the
prosecutor has referred to the cloak of innocence as having been lifted, shredded,
stripped away, or otherwise removed by the State or its evidence. In Pagano v. Allard,
218 F.Supp.2d 26 (D. Mass. 2002) the federal district court of Massachusetts found that
the prosecutor's closing argument that the defendant's protection from the cloak of
innocence had now come off violated the petitioner's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent because it incorrectly suggested that the presumption of innocence would not
apply during jury deliberations. Id.

Likewise, the Illinois appellate courts have found

that it is improper to state that the presumption of innocence has been lifted because it
is not lifted until the defendant is found guilty by the jury.

People v. Brooks, 345

III.App.3d 945, 949-50, 803 N.E.2d 626, 629-30 (Ill. App. 2004); People v. Toney, 337
11I.App.3d 122, 148-50, 785 N.S.2d 138, 159-161 (Ill. App. 2003) (stating that the
defendant "enjoys the presumption of innocence until the jury decides during
deliberations that the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses, and therefore, the
prosecutor's comment that the defendant was no longer cloaked in innocence because
"[w]e have torn that from him" or similar comments should not be repeated during the
retrial already ordered).

Finally, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has

repeatedly addressed this issue and found it was misconduct to refer to the cloak of
innocence as being lifted during closing arguments. Hamilton v. State, 937 P.2d 1001
(Ok. Crim. App. 1997) (ruling that although the references to the cloak of innocence
being stripped away were misconduct, the misconduct was harmless) abrogated on
other grounds by Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498 (Ok. Crim. App. 1999); Miller v. State,
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843 P.2d 389 (Ok. Crim. App. 1992) (finding that prosecutor's comments that the
defendant's cloak of innocence was gone "ripped away from him by the testimony of
three men-four men, actually" and that, therefore, the defendant was "guilty as charged"
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair").
Here, the prosecutor in this case began her closing argument by stating:
I talked a little bit during voir dire about a cloak of innocence being
placed on Ms. Eldred's shoulders when she walked in that door, and it
was a heavy cloak, because it is a heavy burden to remove it. And it is a
burden that I, and I alone must suffer. And it is a burden that I must
present my testimony and I must show you my exhibits. And only through
that, can that cloak be lifted.
Ladies and gentlemen, the cloak has been lifted. Ms. Eldred is
guilty of driving under the influence ....
(Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.12-22.) like the cases from other jurisdictions cited above, this
statement by the prosecutor infers that Ms. Eldred's presumption of innocence has
already been lifted before the case is submitted to the jury.
Additionally, by stating unequivocally, "Ms. Eldred is guilty of driving under the
influence" the prosecutor is improperly expressing her own belief in Ms. Eldred's guilt.
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.

Furthermore, this case is even more

egregious than those cited above because the State also referred to the burden of proof
as a burden she must "suffer." This comment also misrepresents the burden of proof
and plays on the jury's emotions by implying that this burden is something bad or
burdensome for the prosecution to carry. See id. Therefore, the prosecutor's argument
related to her burden of proof and Ms. Eldred's cloak of innocence was prosecutorial
misconduct amounting to fundamental error.
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2.

The Prosecutor Improperly Misrepresented The Evidence In Closing
Arguments

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause's prohibition on knowingly using
false evidence to obtain a conviction, applies not only to entirely fabricated evidence,
but to arguments that misstate the evidence adduced at trial. See Miller v. Pate, 386
U.S. 1, 7 (1967); United States

v. Feams, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974).

Therefore, a prosecutor cannot misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence during his
closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Here, the prosecutor
mischaracterized the evidence presented in her closing argument by stating that Ms.
Eldred "refused" to properly blow into the intoxilyzer machine.
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated "[w]e didn't get that good bottom
breath that Deputy Davlin talked about, the good bottom breath that could have resulted
in a higher blow. And why? Because she didn't want to blow properly. She refused to
blow properly." (Trial Tr., p.234, Ls.8-12.) However this was a misrepresentation of the
testimony presented. There was never any testimony admitted at trial that Ms. Eldred
did not want to blow properly or refused to blow properly.
Officer Chamberlain testified that he explained to Ms. Eldred how she needed to
blow into the machine. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.9-10.) She then blew into the machine, but
her samples were deficient. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.1-4.) Officer Chamberlain did testify
that Ms. Eldred "was attempting to blow, but she was doing an exaggerated ... cheeks
puffed out [blow]."

(Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.20-21.)

He stated "[i]t looked like she was

blowing extremely hard, but the machine was indicating to me that it was not receiving."
(Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.21-23.) However, this testimony does not indicate Ms. Eldred was
purposefully refusing to blow properly or that she did not want to blow properly. In fact,
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Officer Chamberlain admitted that deficient samples can be caused when someone
does not blow hard enough or long enough into the tube and that people putting their
tongue over the mouthpiece when the blow is a common cause of a deficient sample."
(Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.10-17.) Deputy Davlin also explained different causes of deficient
samples and noted that ultimately it is up to the person blowing, how they blow in the
tube. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.13- p.167, L.12.) However, this testimony does not indicate
that someone not properly blowing in the tube is intentionally not providing a sample, as
perhaps the person just does not understand how to properly blow in the tube.
Therefore, by misrepresenting the testimony and implying Ms. Eldred refused to
provide an adequate sample, the prosecutor committed misconduct resulting in
fundamental error.
3.

The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jury's Emotions, Asking
The Jury To Image Themselves In The "Victim's" Shoes

The prosecutor also tried to appeal to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of
the jury by the use of inflammatory tactics designed to place the jury in the shoes of the
"victim" and repeatedly referring to the fact that Ms. Eldred could have killed someone.
See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 587-588. It is improper for a prosecutor to urge jurors to

convict a criminal defendant by appealing "to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of
the jury." Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. This includes urging a conviction to protect
community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. Id. The problem
with appeals to emotion is that it encourages the jury to convict the defendant based on
reasons entirely separate from his own guilt or innocence. Id.; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87,
156 P.3d at 588 ("Nothing should tempt [the prosecutor] to appeal to prejudices, to
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pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which whether true or not, have
not been proved.").
During its closing argument, the State improperly tried to put the jury in "the
victim's" shoes, stating in closing, "At this point in time, we are driving two lanes down
the interstate. It is the afternoon. People are just driving the roads, you or I." (Trial Tr.,
p.220, L.24 - p.221, L.2.) By referring to the fact that people such as the prosecutor or
jury members could have been driving down the road, the prosecutor is insinuating that
any one of us could have been a victim of Ms. Eldred's alleged drinking and driving.
Furthermore, the State repeatedly referenced the fact that Ms. Eldred could have
killed someone while she was driving.

The prosecutor stated "[a]II of this time, the

defense would have you believe she is scared. It is that fear that is making her drive in
a manner that could kill somebody." (Trial Tr., p.221, Ls.21-23.) The prosecutor also
stated:
Mr. Jones testified that this whole process took almost two hours. For
almost two hours, he followed Ms. Eldred hoping should wouldn't kill
somebody, to the point he puts his flashers on, and talks about the fact
that he was put there for a reason. There was a reason he was following
her, and it was so cool-I believe were is words-it was so cool, because
none of the cars went by me. He truly believes he saved lives, and all
because Ms. Eldred is driving that white Ford Tempo under the influence.
(Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.3-12.)
The argument to the jury that "you or I" could have been driving down the road
when Ms. Eldred got into an accident and the repeated references to the fact that
Ms. Eldred could have killed someone were appeals the jury's emotions and urged the
jury to convict Ms. Eldred, not based on her blood alcohol content, but because she
could have injured or killed someone and "you or I" could have been driving down the
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road when that happened. Therefore the prosecutor committed misconduct in making
these arguments, amounting to fundamental error.
4.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was
Ms. Eldred Of Her Right To A Fair Trial

Not Harmless And

Deprived

As set forth above, the numerous improper statements by the prosecutor each
individually, or alternatively, viewed as whole, cannot be harmless. See State v. Gross,
146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477,483 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504,
37 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the,
"accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the
aggregate show the absence of a fair trial."). "Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). In State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme
Court, when reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the
United States Supreme Court which found:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.'
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88

(1935) (emphasis added)).
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Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of
the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Ms. Eldred's conviction. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034,

1043 (1980). Much of this case hinged on whether the jurors believed the accuracy of
the breath test results and the witness' testimony. Although the BAC was .264, the
results were obtained from a deficient sample.

(Trial Tr., p.119, L.13 - p.120, L.8.)

Mr. Jones was the only witness who saw Ms. Eldred driving; therefore whether the jury
found him to be a credible witness was crucial. There were also contradictions in the
testimony between Mr. Jones and Officer Chamberlain. The State's witness' testimony
contradicted the Officer's. Mr. Jones testified that "she hit the door as the officer parked
his car." (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.3-5). Whereas, the officer testified that when he got out of
his car she was still outside and he pursued her into the residence. (Trial Tr., p.97, L.10
- p 102, L.7.)
Ms. Eldred's friend, and owner of the home in Middleton, James Ashby, testified
that when Ms. Eldred arrived at his home she was "a nervous wreck" and was scared
because a person had been following her.

(Trial Tr., p.182, L.9 - p.183, L.9.)

He

explained that Ms. Eldred's apartment had been broken into and things had been taken,
making her more fearful than usual. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.22 - p.184, L.16.) Additionally,
Mr. Ashby testified that Ms. Eldred's white Tempo did not drive very well, stating "I
drove it back from Boise and you couldn't even stay on the freeway ... The steering is
messed up, or something, because I was all over the road." (Trial Tr., p.184, L.22 p.185, L.3.) Finally, Mr. Ashby testified that Ms. Eldred arrived approximately five to
fifteen minutes before Officer Chamberlain entered the home and that she drank
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straight vodka that he had poured her into a coffee cup in that time. (Trial Tr., p.185,
L.15-p.186, L.18.)

Additionally, some of the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred would
encourage the jury to convict based on factors outside evidence.

For example, the

State misrepresented the presumption of innocence as having ended before the case
was submitted to the jury.

The State also misrepresented the fact that Ms. Eldred

purposefully did not provide an adequate sample. Finally, the State relied upon the
ease of which the juror's could place themselves in the shoes of a potential victim
driving down the road and being hit by a potentially drunk driver.

Therefore, the

prosecutor's appeal to their emotions and prejudices by attempting to have the jurors
envision themselves as potential victims and repeated references to the fact that
Ms. Eldred could have killed someone were likely highly effective given the nature of the
charge.
Finally, even if each incident separately is deemed harmless, the cumulative
effect of the prosecutor's misconduct so infected the prosecutor's closing argument that
Ms. Eldred was deprived of a fair trial and this Court cannot say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the jury's verdict would have been the same.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Eldred respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction for felony
DUI and remand her case to the district court for a new trial. Additionally, Ms. Eldred
respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence or the Order denying her Rule
35 motion and reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand her case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of December, 20

EATHER M. A
ON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

16

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29 th day of December, 2008, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF. by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
SHARON K ELDRED
INMATE # 76309
WOMEN'S WORK CENTER
2366 OLD PENITENTIARY ROAD
BOISE ID 83712
GORDON W PETRIE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED A COPY OF BRIEF
THOMAS A SULLIVAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED COPY OF BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court

c-::=2?[3;~~
..2'

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

HMC leas

17

=

~

